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Corbin: Senator Robert C. Byrd, the Unsung Hero of Watergate

SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD, THE "UNSUNG HERO"
OF WATERGATE

David A. Corbin*
"The Senate and the country owe Senator Byrd a vote of thanks. In
fairness to him and to the history of this affair [Watergate], his role in bringing
this sordidmess to lightjustly deserves both to be noted and praised."
Senator William Proxmire
May 3, 1973
Senator Robert C. Byrd was the "unsung hero of [the] Watergate investigation," proclaimed Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) on the floor of the U.S.
Senate on May 3, 1973.1 "[Flor months the Watergate scandal was swept under
the rug," he charged: "It was referred to as a 'caper.' It had little effect on the
election. The American people were bored with reports of it.",2 But, Proxmire

explained, "three significant actions [brought] the immense proportions of the
scandal" into the open. 3 Two of the forces, Judge John Sirica and the Washington Post, he said, were widely recognized. "[T]here was a third event," he
pointed out, that "essentially broke open the Watergate case," and that was
Senator Byrd's questioning of the President's nominee to head the FBI, Mr. L.
Patrick Gray.4 Byrd's "doggedness and persistence in questioning brought the
admission from Mr. Gray that Mr. Dean of the White
House had lied... [and
5
avalanche.,
an
started
It
case.
the
open
broke
this]
Other observers at the time acknowledged the importance of Byrd's
questioning of Gray in uncovering the Watergate scandal. The veteran reporter

Dr. David A. Corbin currently serves on the staff of Senator Robert C. Byrd. Previously, he had served on the Senate Democratic Policy Committee for Senate Majority Leaders
Byrd, George Mitchell (D-ME), and Tom Daschle (D-SD). He received his AB and MA degrees
in history from Marshall University, and his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland. He has
taught history for the University of Maryland, University-College, and has published extensively
on West Virginia coal miners, including, Life, Work, and Rebellion in the CoalFields. Dr. Corbin
would like to express his thanks to the following people for having read early drafts of this article
and making important contributions: Mr. Brian Booth, Ms. Anne Barth, Judge Joseph R. Good*

win, and Senate Historians Drs. Richard Baker and Donald Ritchie.
1
119 CONG. REc. S 14098 (daily ed. May 3, 1973) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.
Id.

5
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Clark Mollenhoff, also called Byrd the "unsung hero" of Watergate, and wrote
that the people of the United States "owe a special debt to Sen. Bob Byrd for
saving the nation from 'four more years' of Watergate tactics or worse." 6 It was
Byrd, wrote the columnist
Carl T. Rowan, who "flushed out the first hints of the
7
Watergate cover-up.",
Senator Byrd "deserves great credit for making certain that the Watergate scandal will ultimately be revealed in all its dimensions," concluded Proxmire in his May
3 remarks, but he "has never received appropriate recognition
8
for his part.",
Three decades later, Byrd still has not received the attention to which he
is entitled for breaking open the Watergate investigation. Although Byrd has
held more Senate leadership positions than any other person, is the secondlongest serving member in Senate history, has cast more roll-call votes than any
other Senator in history, and has two offices full of honors, awards, and various
other forms of recognition, he has never received historical recognition "for
making certain" that the Watergate scandal was "revealed in all its dimensions." 9 Or, as Mollenhoff wrote, "for saving the nation from four more years'
of Watergate tactics or worse."' 0 Byrd, along with Judge Sirica and Washington
Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, played a crucial role in bringing down a corrupt presidential administration that threatened the American
political process and the constitutional foundations of the United States.
Byrd's role in uncovering the Watergate scandal is also crucial to understanding his political career. By enabling him to solidify his support among
the different factions of the Senate Democratic Conference, it proved to be a
major stepping stone on his path to becoming Majority Leader of the United
States Senate.
It all began on June 17, 1972, with the break-in at the headquarters of
the Democratic National Committee in the Washington, D.C., apartment-office
complex named Watergate. Five men, James W. McCord, Bernard Barker, Virgilio Gonzalez, Eugenio R. Martinez, and Frank Sturgis were arrested for burglarizing and bugging the office. The men were an assortment of former FBI
and CIA operatives, and anti-Castro Cubans. One of them, McCord, was chief

6

Clark R. Mollenhoff, Sen. R.C. Byrd, 'Unsung Hero,' RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, June,

24, 1973, at A20.
7
Carl T. Rowan, Byrd's Metamorphosis, WASH. STAR, Jan. 12 1977, at AI7.
8
119 CONG. REc. S 14098 (daily ed. May 3, 1973) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
9
For a compilation of Byrd's achievements, see Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle's (DSD) remarks when Byrd cast his unprecedented 14,000th vote. U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 27 July 1995, 20639-40. For Byrd's election to Senate
Leadership positions, see ROBERT C. BYRD, ROBERT C. BYRD: CHILD OF THE APPALACHIAN
COALFIELDS 194-95 (West Virginia University Press 2005) (Secretary of Senate Democratic Con-

ference), 294-7 (Senate Democratic Whip), and 377-9 (Senate Majority Leader).
10
Mollenhoff, supra note 6, at 24.
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of security for the Republican National Committee as well as the Committee to
Reelect the President (CRP)."
Because of the burglars' various connections to the CRP, Nixon's campaign manager, former Attorney General John Mitchell, quickly moved to disassociate both the Republican Party and the Presidential campaign from the breakin. 12 He declared that none of the accused were "operating on our behalf or with
our [CRP] consent.' 13 Likewise, on June 22, President Nixon attempted to
separate the Administration from Watergate when he
14 issued a statement saying
that "White House had no involvement whatsoever."'
On September 15, a grand jury indicted the five men and two others for
conspiracy, burglary, and violation of federal wiretapping laws. 15 The two additional men were Gordon Liddy (counsel to the Committee to Re-elect the President) and
E. Howard Hunt (a White House consultant and former CIA em16
ployee).
During the 1972 presidential campaign, Democrats tried unsuccessfully
17
to make the break-in at the DNC headquarters a political campaign issue.
They alleged that the Nixon Administration surely
was behind the scandal and
18
was out to subvert the American political process.
Two young, low-level metro reporters for the Washington Post, Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein, became interested in the story and began to investigate it. Outside those two reporters, the national media ignored the event.
Like the American people, the nation's newspapers and magazines could not see
any possible larger dimension to the Watergate break-in. Polls showed Nixon
leading every potential Democratic challenger by at least nineteen points, 19
therefore, few Americans could believe that the Nixon Administration or the
Republican party would have any reason to be involved in such a stupid, poorly
planned and inept operation. Nixon's Press Secretary Ron Ziegler dismissed the

1

Watergate Scandal: A Senate Search for the Truth, in Congressional Quarterly, Watergate:

Chronology of a Crisis (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1973) 1-2; KEITH W. OLSON, WATERGATE:
THE PRESIDENTIAL SCANDAL THAT SHOOK AMERICA 38-9 (University of Kansas 2003).
12
PHILIP B. KURLAND, The Watergate Inquiry 1973, in CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A
DOCUMENTED HISTORY, 1792-1974 3921, 3926 (Roger Bruns & Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. eds.,
Chelsae House Publishers 1975).
14

Id. at 3926.
Id. at 3925-6.

15

OLSON,

16

Watergate Scandal: A Senate Search for the Truth, 31

13

supra note 11, at 67-8.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 835
(April 14, 1973).
17
OLSON, supra note I1, at 177.
18
CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 21 (Simon and Schuster

1974).
19

Id. at 19.
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break-in as a "third rate" burglary and the nation seemed satisfied with that description. 20
In November, the American people re-elected Nixon as President, giving him nearly 61 percent of the popular vote, and 97 percent of the electoral
vote, making it one of the greatest landslide victories in presidential history.2 '
Two months later, in January of 1973, the trial of seven Watergate burglars quietly ran its course, without any suggestion that higher-ups might have been involved. Hunt, Barker, Gonzalez, Martinez, and Sturgis all entered guilty
pleas. 22 Liddy and McCord were convicted by the jury. 23 President Nixon and
White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler continued to insist that no White
House people had been involved, and now dismissed the caper, as they called it,
' 24
as a "bizarre affair.
The story of the Watergate break-in seemed destined to be buried as the
Nixon Administration now stood at the zenith of its power and prestige. Nixon
had just been overwhelmingly re-elected.25 In January, a Gallup poll gave
Nixon an extraordinary 68 percent approval rating.26 The Watergate puzzle was
unsolved, and looked to remain that way.
There were, however, important skeptics. The man who had presided
over the trial of the Watergate burglars, Judge John Sirica, said he suspected that
the full truth regarding Watergate was being hidden.27 He publicly complained
that he was concerned that all of the pertinent facts that might be available had
not been produced before an American jury, and that the trial had not succeeded
in bringing out the motive behind the burglary.28 At the Washington Post,
Woodward and Bernstein, continued to chip away at the White House's wall of
silence. 29
Walter Pincus, The Latest Cover-Up, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 30 June, 1973, 14.

20

1789-2004, at 72-73 (CQ Press
2005) [hereinafter Presidential Elections]; RICHARD M. SCAMMON (Government Affairs Institute),
AMERICA VOTES 10: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ELECTION STATISTICS, 1972, at
13 (CQ Press 1973); ALICE V. McGILLIVRAY, RICHARD M. SCAMMON, & RHODES COOK, AMERICA
21

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,

AT THE POLLS, 1960-2004: A HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS STATISTICS, at 19

(CQ Press 2005).
OLSON, supra note 11, at 69; CLARK R. MOLLENHOFF, GAME PLAN FOR DISASTER: AN

22

OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT ON THE NIXON YEARS 254-256 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1976).
23
OLSON, supra note 11, at 70; MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 258.
24

SAM J. ERVIN, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SENATOR SAM J.

ERVIN, JR. 319 (Michie Company, Law Publishers 1984); MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 259.
25
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 21, at 72-73; SCAMMON, supra note 21, at 13;
MCGILLIVRAY, SCAMMON, & COOK, supra note 21, at 19.
26
DICK DABNEY, A GOOD MAN: THE LIFE OF SAM J. ERVIN 261-2 (Houghton Mifflin Co.

1976).
27

MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 259; ERVIN, supra note 24, at 318.

28

MOLLENHOFF,

29

DONALD A. RITCHIE, REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON: THE HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON

supra note 22, at 259; ERVIN, supra note 24, at, 319.

PRESS CORPS 218-240 (Oxford University Press, 2005); Washington Deceit, 218-40; OLSON,
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Another skeptic was the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (DMT), who was deeply distressed by the Watergate affair. If the 1972 presidential campaign had been sabotaged, as it appeared to him to have been, Mansfield
believed that the entire American political process could be in jeopardy. 30 Several times he discussed his concerns with Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC), a brilliant
constitutional attorney and member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 31 As a
result, on February 5, Senator Ervin offered on behalf of himself and Mansfield
a resolution:
to establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any persons,
acting individually or in combination with others, in the presidential election of321972, or any campaign, canvass, or other activity related to it.
On February 7, 1973, the Senate adopted the resolution by a vote of 77
Although the select committee would become known as the Senate Watergate Committee, its purpose was, as the resolution stated, to investigate the
irregularities in the election, not the break-in at the DNC headquarters. 34 Therefore, few of its creators expected anything to come of the Committee. It did not
even have its first public hearing until the middle of May, which was more than
three months away. 35 Through February 1973, the cover-up continued to seem
secure.
Then came the Senate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings for
L. Patrick Gray III, who Nixon had nominated to be Director of the FBI. Gray,
a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, had served as a captain of a submarine and obtained a law degree. Most importantly, he was
Nixon's type of man - a complete Nixon loyalist. 36 "Oh, God, I wish we had, I
wish we had more Pat Grays," Nixon had commented at one point.37 In 1960,
to 0.

33

supra note 11, at 59-65. Woodward and Bernstein also detail their efforts in ALL THE PRESIDENT'S
MEN, supra note 18.
30

DON OBERDORFER,

SENATOR MANSFIELD: THE EXTRAORDINARY

LIFE OF A GREAT

STATESMAN AND DIPLOMAT 431-32 (Smithsonian Books 2003).

supra note 26, at 260-62; ERVIN, supra note 11, at 318-19.
S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 119 Cong. Rec. 3849 (1973) (enacted).
33
Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, Senate Votes Watergate Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
1973, at Al.
34
Id.
35 Id.
36
For an example of the loyalty Nixon demanded from his staff, see THEODORE WHITE,
BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 176-8 (Atheneum Publishers 1975).
31

DABNEY,

32

37

FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF

RICHARD NIXON 245 (Random House 1994).
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Gray gave up his promising career in the Navy in order to work for Nixon when
he was Vice President. In 1968, Gray worked on Nixon's presidential campaign, and after the election, served in several capacities in the Nixon Administration, including a stint at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
and then at the Justice Department where he served as Deputy Attorney General.3 8
By 1972, Nixon was considering Gray for several high-level jobs, including an ambassadorship or a federal appeals judgeship. 39 Upon the death of
J. Edgar Hoover, however, Nixon named Gray acting director of the FBI.4°
While Gray was serving as acting FBI director, the agency conducted its investigation into the Watergate break-in. Apparently satisfied with the job Gray had
done, on February 17, 1973, Nixon named Gray to be the permanent director,
41
and sent his nomination to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
White House tapes of conversations between Nixon and Gray indicate
that Gray went into the Senate hearings believing that he would have no trouble
handling Congress. 42 Nixon, with his long and hostile relationship with Congress, warned Gray to be careful. But Gray told the President not to worry.
43
"Nixon loyalist.., you're goddamn right I am," Gray assured the President.
The President's counsel, John W. Dean III, was also reassuring. On
February 28, the first day of the Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearing,
Dean said to Nixon, "I'm convinced we're going to make it the whole road and
put this thing [Watergate] in the funny pages of the history books rather than
anything serious." 44
There did not seem to be any reason for Gray to worry. He had been the
acting FBI Director for almost a year, since May, 1972.45 Furthermore, Gray
had received favorable treatment in the nation's media. Lamenting the media's
initial lack of interest in Gray, Mollenhoff later wrote, that "large numbers of
newspaper editors and columnists bought the line that Gray's appointment
38

Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray 111, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary93d Cong. 29 (1973) (statements of

Louis Patrick Gray III, nominee) [hereinafter Gray ConfirmationHearings].
39
EMERY, supra note 37, at 245.
40
Gray ConfirmationHearings,supra note 38, at 5-6.
41 Robert C. Toth & Ronald J. Ostrow, Nixon to Nominate Gray to Head FBI, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1973, at Ai; Philip Warden, Nixon Nominates Gray as Permanent Director of
FBI, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 18 February 1973, at 20.
42
EMERY, supra note 37, at 245.
43

Id. at 247.

44

J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS 292 (Viking Press

1976).
45
In retrospect, several writers have maintained that nominating Gray was Nixon's big mistake. "Amazingly Nixon handed Congress a dagger with which to probe Gray's role in Watergate

-- months before Ervin and Baker were ready," wrote Emery. EMERY, supra note 37, at 244. This
may have been easy to see in retrospect, but it overlooks the initial, overwhelmingly favorable
attitudes toward Gray. See also, BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 267.
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would mean that "a 'nice guy' would finally be heading the FBI," after having
to put up with Hoover for a number of years.46
Congressional reaction to Nixon's nominee was also reassuring.4 7 Senate Leader Mansfield (D-MT) had announced his support for confirmation.48
The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator James Eastland (DMS) predicted an easy confirmation.4 9 Gray was considered such a sure thing
that the liberals on the Senate Committee were concerned that opposition to him
might be politically hazardous. Senator John Tunney (D-CA) acknowledged
that he had concerns about Gray, but said he would vote for his confirmation
because of the overwhelming public and media support of him. 50
The two Connecticut Senators who introduced Gray to the Judiciary
Committee did so in gushing terms. Democratic Senator Abraham Ribicoff said
he had known Gray for "many years," and had always found him "to be a man
of outstanding ability, character, and integrity."'', Gray would "perform his
52
tasks" as FBI director, Ribicoff said, "on a completely non-partisan basis.
The other Connecticut Senator, Lowell Weicker, a Republican, depicted Gray as
a "man of absolute integrity. 53
Once the hearings began, they took on an almost casual, light-hearted
atmosphere with joking and friendly give-and-takes,54 and more accolades from
more Senators. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) called Gray a "man of char55 He was, said Thurmond, "the type
acter .... a man of ability and dedication.
56
government.,
in
need
of man we
The Senators sat and listened as Gray, in his opening testimony, told
them that President Nixon had given him one instruction -- that the "FBI and its
Director continue to stay out of politics and to remain free of politics. '57 The
Senators were pleased to hear Gray tell them of the thorough job the FBI had
done in investigating the Watergate break-in. He cited the number of agents
that had been assigned to the investigation, the number of man hours they had

46

See Mollenhoff, supra note 6.

47

Warden, supra note 41, at 20.
Man Overboard,NEW REPUBLIC, April 21 1973, at 7.

48

49

See The FBI's Man in a Squeeze, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 26, 1973 at 33;
269.
22, at 273: Mollenhoff, supra note 6.
Gray Confinnation Hearings,supra note 38, at 1.
Id.

MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at
50
MOLLENHOFF, supra note
51
52

53
55

Id. at 3.
See, e.g., id. at 75, 81-2.
Id. at 82.

56

Id. For other Senators' praise of Gray, see, for example, the statement of Senator Roman L.

54

Hruska, (R-NE), see id. at 54.
57 Id. at 8.
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put in, and the number of people they had interviewed.5 8 It was a "full court
investigation," 59 Gray told them, a "no holds barred investigation., 60 '"There
were no restrictions or limitations" 6 1 placed on the FBI investigation, he declared, "we have done everything that we could possibly do. 62 After Gray had
finished, Senator John L. McClellan (D-AR) remarked, "on
63 the basis of that
confirmation."
to
entitled
be
would
he
course,
of
statement,
In the context of this relaxed atmosphere and friendly exchanges between the nominee and his inquisitors, Gray told the Senators how he had
shared FBI investigation files with White House staffers, namely President
Nixon's counsel, John Dean. "The President specifically charged him [Dean]
with looking into any involvement on the part of White House staff members,"
Gray explained. 64 According to Gray, it was not unusual for the FBI to share its
files with White House on what he called, "major special cases. 65 That cooperation with the White House included discussing the investigation with Dean,
and allowing the President's counsel to sit in on FBI interviews with Watergate
suspects. 66 In that atmosphere, Gray offered members of the Judiciary Commit67
tee full access to the FBI's files on its Watergate investigation.
The exception to Gray's admiring throngs was Senator Robert C. Byrd
who had already expressed strong reservations about the FBI Director's partisan
political activities. A few days earlier, in a lengthy floor statement, Byrd had
detailed Gray's work for the Republican Party, especially for Nixon, including
his participation in Nixon's presidential campaigns of 1960 and 1968.68 "His
background," said Byrd, "includes a history of Republican
Party activities, and
69
this tends to make his appointment appear political.
The White House recognized Byrd's possible opposition, but did not
seem concerned about it. Judiciary Committee Chairman James Eastland had
repeatedly told White House officials that he had the votes for confirmation. 7 °
Furthermore, according to White House Domestic Policy Adviser John D. Ehrlichman, although Nixon had once considered Byrd for the Supreme Court, the
58

Id.at 78.

59

Id.at 82.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 27.

60
61

62
63

Id.at 27, 82-3.
Id. at 28.

64

id. at 45.

65

Id. at 45, 61.

66

68

Id. at 331.
Id. at 28.
119 Cong. Rec. S4349 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1973).

69

Id.

70

STANLEY

67

I.

KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON TAPES
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President considered Byrd as a man of "limited ability.'
White House Press
Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler declined to even comment on Byrd's concerns
about Gray's political activities. 72 The White House should have been prepared.
Byrd was.
Under Byrd's instructions, his staff had collected Gray's speeches and
testimonies, and newspaper and magazine articles about him. His staffer on the
Judiciary Committee, Tom Hart, had compiled the material into loose-leaf binders, complete with a card index.73 In preparing for the Gray conformation hearings, Byrd spent hours reading, studying, and memorizing Hart's notebooks and
files.74
Although Byrd was the Senate Democratic Whip, he was a latecomer on
the Judiciary Committee.75 Therefore, his turn to question Gray on the first day
of the hearings did not come until late in the afternoon. In fact, the chair of the
Committee had actually tried to adjourn the hearings for the day but Byrd asked
that they be extended so he could question Gray.76 When the Committee
chairman agreed, Byrd began hammering away at Gray's partisan political activities. Once Byrd started his questioning,
wrote Mollenhoff, "I was certain the
77
Gray nomination was in trouble.,
Gray had already acknowledged in the hearings that he had made sixteen public speeches during the 1972 presidential election, raising the specter
that as acting FBI director, he had continued his partisan political activities.78
Gray had tried to dismiss the speeches as nothing more than generic, patriotic,
"feel good" about America speeches, while insisting that there was nothing
overtly political or partisan in his remarks.79
Byrd would have no part of it. He bluntly declared that he still had
strong reservations about Gray's "political activities over a long period of time,"
and that the speeches indicated that Gray had continued to be "very active in
behalf of the Republican Party." 80 Byrd then explained:
If this were a nomination to a Cabinet office, it wouldn't trouble
me at all in that regard, because I would expect the President to
name people to Cabinet offices who have been active politically
71
72

JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 136 (Simon & Schuster 1980).
BYRD, supra note 9, at 328.

73

WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 271-2.

Hart also shared his files with Washington Post reporters, Woodward and Bernstein. Id. at
271-2.
75
Byrd was appointed to the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 14, 1969.
76
Gray Confirmation Hearings,supra note 38, at 99.
74

77

MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 270.

78

Gray Confirmation Hearings,supra note 38, at 29.
Id. at 29, 30. For an example of Gray's speeches, see id. at 108-110.
Id. at 100, 103.

79
80
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on his behalf. But in view of the fact that this is the directorship
of the FBI, it does concern me because I fear that the FBI
could, under a politically oriented Director,become the political arm of the White House ....
"The politicization of the FBI," Byrd charged, would not only be dangerous to the "protection of the constitutional liberties of our people," it would
constitute "the82first step toward the conversion of the FBI into a sort of American Gestapo."
Byrd then turned his attention to the ineptness of the FBI's investigation
into the Watergate break-in. Having studied the various statements by Judge
Sirica, Byrd said he "instinctively surmised" that Gray's investigation of the
Watergate break-in should be examined.83 He was impressed, not with what the
FBI had done, but what it had failed to do. "The FBI investigation of the Watergate burglary apparently was aimed only at the actual events surrounding the
breaking and entering of the National Democratic Committee headquarters and
avoided any attempt toward tying together the leads concerning where the plot
originated," Byrd had complained on a previous occasion. 84 Therefore, in the
hearings, he raised questions about the FBI's lack of thoroughness in its Watergate investigation.85 He wanted to know why Gray, under instructions from
Attorney General Kleindienst, had limited the scope of the FBI investigation.86
He wanted to know how it was that the FBI could trace delivery of the transcripts of the Watergate buggings all the way to 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue,
where the offices of the Committee to Re-elect the President received them, but
could trace them no further.87
Horrified by the revelations that Gray had turned over FBI files to Dean
and had allowed the President's counsel to sit in on FBI interviews, Byrd told
reporters that he had concerns that White House staffers may have been using
Gray to help cover up the break-in. 88 Others on the Judiciary Committee apparently felt the same way. Committee members openly talked of having Dean
appear before the committee to answer questions about the White House's role
in the FBI investigation.8 9

82

Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
Id. at 100.

83

BYRD,

81

84

85
86

supra note 9, at 329-30.
119 Cong. Rec. S4349 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1973) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
Gray Confirmation Hearings,supra note 38, at 309-311, 316, 317.
Id. at 119-22, 129; MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 271-2.

88

Gray Confirmation Hearings,supra note 38, at 141.
MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 272-73.

89

Joy Aschenbach, Snub on Dean Step Up Gray's Foes' Efforts, WASH. EVENING STAR, Mar.

87

15, 1973, at A2; John P. MacKenzie, Nixon Says He Won't Let Aide testify on Gray Appointment,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3 1973, at A3; KURLAND, supra note 12, at 3928.
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Nixon promptly announced that he would not allow it. Maybe it was
Nixon being Nixon. Maybe it was in response to Gray's loose lips about telling
the Judiciary Committee how he had shared the FBI files with Dean and allowed
him to sit in on interviews. More likely, it was in response to Byrd's pointed
questions to Gray. Whatever the reason, two days later, at a March 2 news conference, Nixon declared that he was invoking executive privilege to prevent
certain White House aides from testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee.90 Asked about the possibility of White House counsel Dean being summoned to the confirmation hearings, Nixon responded: "No president could ever
allow the counsel to the president to go down and testify before a committee." 9 1
There would be seven more sessions to the Committee's confirmation
hearings.92 Each time, when it was Byrd's turn to question Gray, Byrd elicited
more and more damaging information as he confirmed his suspicions about
White House influence over the FBI, especially that Gray, the successor to the
throne of the powerful and independent J. Edgar Hoover, had essentially functioned as a valet to the President's counsel.93 Gray had even stored material that
Dean 94had taken from the office of one of the Watergate conspirators, E. Howard
Hunt.

Responding to questions from Byrd, Gray acknowledged that a number
of the FBI agents who had investigated Watergate had been transferred out of
the Washington area.9 5 Under questioning from Byrd, Gray admitted
to errors
96
in his previous testimony to the Committee and apologized for them.
Byrd caught Gray in various mistakes and untruths in statements he had
made in his testimony about the investigation.9 7 In one instance, Byrd asked
Gray if anyone else was present when he interviewed Ehrlichman at the White
House. Gray answered, "No, I believe not." In a press release, Byrd pointed out
that Dean was present in a White House meeting when Ehrlichman instructed
Gray to destroy evidence taken from the safe of E. Howard Hunt.98
Gray told Byrd that the FBI files he had sent to Dean included phone
wiretaps of the Democratic Party Watergate offices. 99 After the hearing, Byrd
told newsmen that Gray's divulgence of information to high level Administra90

Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Bars Hill Quizzing of His Aides,

WASH. POST,

Mar. 13 1973, at

Al.
91
92

93
94
95
96

John P. MacKenzie, supra note 89, at A3.
The days of the hearings were February 28, March 1,6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 21, and 22.
Gray Confirmation Hearings,supra note 38, at 123, 309-310, 317, 328, 331.

Id. at 328, 331.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 309-3 10.

See, e.g., id. at 317.
Senator Robert Byrd, Press Release, Apr. 27, 1973 (on file with author). See also Gray
ConfirmationHearings, supra note 38, at 309, 317.
99
John P. MacKenzie, Gray Tells of Relaying Data, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1973, at Al.
97

98
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tion officials "did not square at all" with his testimony that he sought at all times
to protect the confidence of bureau sources.' °°
That same day, March 7, Byrd, who had taken Gray up on his offer of
making the FBI files available to Senators, now made some of those documents
available to reporters. This was a crucial move on Byrd's part. One of these
documents, titled, "Interview with Herbert W. Kalmbach," revealed that Kalmbach (associate finance chairman of CRP), on instructions from the President's
Appointments Secretary Dwight Chapin, had paid Republican party operatives
to undermine the efforts of Democratic presidential party candidates.1l° In other
words, the White House had been directly involved in paying for undercover
political activities including sabotage, spying, and harassment of Democrats.
This document blew away the Nixon Administration's assertions of innocence.
also substantiated some of the most serious claims by Woodward
The document 102
and Bernstein.
Furthermore, with the release of the document, Byrd was bringing the
White House more and more into the Watergate cover-up picture. Most importantly, Byrd had turned the Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings on
Gray into a congressional inquiry into the Watergate scandal!
With Gray's answers to Byrd, it now seemed that Dean, as the President's counsel, was an important player in the Watergate cover-up. Led by
Byrd, along with Tunney, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee were
appearance before the committee was crucial to
now insisting that Dean's
03
confirmation.1
Gray's
By now, the White House was getting nervous over Byrd's interrogation. In private conversations in the Oval Office, Nixon and his staff were discussing Byrd's "strong anti-Gray position," as they called it, and how they
might deal with his determined opposition. °4 The White House apparently decided to deal with it by bunkering down even further. It countermanded Gray's
offer to make any more FBI files available to Senators. Attorney General Richard Kleindienst prohibited Gray from publicly discussing FBI findings, or giving the committee any more FBI documents.10 5 Gray was, however, permitted
to discuss FBI procedures, and this would be all the room Byrd needed.
100

Id.

101 WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 273.
The previous October, an article by Woodward and Bernstein had accused the Nixon Administration of undermining Democratic primaries. The White House adamantly denied the
charge, and denounced the Post story as "Hearsay, innuendo, and guilt by association." DONALD
A. RrrcHm, REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON: THE HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS 232233 (Oxford University Press 2005); EMERY, supra note 37, at 257; WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN,
supra note 18, at 273-74; OLSON, supra note 11, at 72-3.
103
See Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Gray Hearing Calls Nixon Aide, WASH. POST, Mar.
102

14, 1973, at Al; Joy Aschenbach, Snub on Dean Steps Up Gray Foes Efforts, WASH. STAR-NEWS,

Mar. 15, 1973, atA2.
104
See KUTLER, supra note 70, at 219, 290.
105

Joy Aschenbach, Gray Bars Senate Quiz, WASH. STAR-NEWS, Mar. 20, 1973, at Al.
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Nixon next moved to expand the administration's position on executive
privilege. On March 12, five days after Byrd's second interrogation of Gray and
his release of the Kalmbach interview, Nixon issued a new directive reaffirming
and strengthening his position on executive privilege. 1 6 Under no circumstance
Nixon said, would he permit Dean "to testify in either the Watergate investigation or in the current Judiciary Committee hearings on Gray's nomination to be
permanent director of the FBI ....A President must able to place absolute confidence in the advice and assistance offered by members of his staff. 10 7 The
possibility that this advice and assistance could one day become public would
inhibit candor and weaken "the decision making process at the highest levels of
our government."'' 0 8 "The President's use of executive privilege [is] to keep
Dean from testifying
at the Gray hearings," reported the Washington Star-News
°9
the next day.
Nixon's proclamation of executive privilege infuriated the Senate Judiciary Committee. The following day, the committee voted unanimously to call
Dean to testify in the Gray hearings." 0 The day after the vote, citing the President's position on executive privilege, Dean refused the committee's invitation
to appear.1 1' Angered by the refusal, Byrd took to the Senate floor to denounce
both the White House and Dean: "Mr. Dean's testimony before the Judiciary
Committee is vital to any considered judgment on the proper conduct of the FBI
investigation of the Watergate breakin and Mr. Gray's fitness to be director of
the bureau."' " 2 Five days later, on March 19, Byrd delivered a powerful, eyecatching floor statement denouncing Nixon's abuse of the executive privilege. "I
do not question the application of such a doctrine where sensitive communication between the President himself and a member of his Administration are concerned," he said, but "the President is exerting some very extraordinary claims
in connection with an affair that is entirely unworthy of application of the doctrine .... There is no question involving military security in such an appearance by Mr. 3Dean. There is no question involving sensitive relations with other
countries.""

106 Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Executive Privilege Reaffirmed, WASH. POST, Mar. 16,
1973, at Al; Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Bars Hill Quizzing of His Aides, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,

1973, at Al.
Bernstein & Woodward, supra note 106; Kilpatrick, supra note 106.
108 Kilpatrick, supra note 106.
109 Bernstein & Woodward, supra note 106; Kilpatrick, supra note 106.
"o
See Byrd's statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 119 CONG. REc. 7873 (1973).
"'
See Letter from John W. Dean III, to James Eastland (Mar. 14, 1973), reprinted in 119
107

CONG. REC. 7873 (1973).

112
119 CONG. REC. 7873 (1973); Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Hearing Shunned By Dean,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1973, at Al. See also Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Gray Hearing
Calls Nixon Aide, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1973, at Al.
113 119 Cong. Rec. 8352 (1973).
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To Byrd, Nixon's use of executive privilege was the latest phase of the
White House effort to keep the cover on the Watergate scandal. "[I]t is almost
impossible to avoid the suspicion that someone at the White House, in preparing
the statement for Mr. Nixon, was trying to cover up White House involvement
in the ugly campaign of political sabotage and espionage which climaxed in the
Watergate raid."' 1 4 Byrd had made clear that he believed the White House was
involved in the Watergate cover-up.
Byrd proceeded to warn the administration of the serious consequences
of pursuing its stone walling. "If the Senate expects to fulfill its constitutional
role in a system of checks and balances," Byrd charged, "it will do its duty by
refusing to confirm the President's nomination under the circumstances that
surround this case ....If the President wants to close the door on the supply
of
1' 15
information, the Senate ought to close the door on the President's nominee."
Byrd was certainly speaking in concert with Senators Ervin, Tunney,
and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) who were also insisting that Dean testify. On
"Face the Nation," Ervin, who had previously threatened to issue contempt citations for White House officials if they refused to testify before the committee,
declared that the Judiciary Committee would not only hold up action on Gray,
but also send the Senate's Sergeant-At-Arms to arrest Dean or any other White
House aide who refused to testify.ll 6 The threat of non-confirmation, however,
was not enough to persuade the White House to let Dean testify. Determined to
protect Dean, the White House was prepared to sacrifice Gray. Ehrlichman told
17
Dean, "Let him [Gray] hang there; let him twist slowly, slowly in the wind."',
Dean was seeing for himself that once a person was no longer useful to
the Nixon White House, despite past service to Nixon, and regardless of present
loyalties, that person became dispensable.118
On the eighth and final day of the hearing, Byrd's resumed his intense
grilling of Gray. This time the interrogation lasted for more than two hours." 19
By now, Byrd was coming to everyone's attention. He was even being recognized by liberals who once thought of him as a conservative, pro-Nixon Democrat. "In the course of the hearings, he [Byrd] has shown
that Mr. Gray was very
20
solicitous of the White House," wrote Joseph Kraft. 1
Byrd, however, was onto a more important point. He had already transformed the confirmation hearings into a congressional inquiry into the FBI's
114

116

Id.
Id. at 8353.
See MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 282.

117

EMERY,

115

118
119

supra note 37, at 247.
See KURLAND, supra note 12, at 3928.
Spencer Rich, Gray Concedes Dean 'Probably' Lied to FBI, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1973, at

Al; William Ringle, Gray Admits to Byrd Watergate Lie Possible, HERALD DISPATCH, Mar. 23,
1973, at Al ; Joy Ashenbach, Senate Panel May Call Dean, Wash. Star, Mar. 11, 1973, at A19.
120
Joseph Kraft, Ouoflanking the Presidenton the Right, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1973, at A19.
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failure to fully investigate the Watergate break-in. Now Byrd was about to take
it a step further.
In questioning Gray, Byrd recounted that on June 19 and 20, under
Dean's instructions, two White House aides had searched the safe in Hunt's
office in the Executive Office Building. 121
Then Byrd carefully recounted that on June 22, during the FBI interview with White House Special Counsel Charles Colson, which Dean attended,
in a reply to a remark by one of the FBI agents, Dean said that he did not know
House. Gray quoted Dean as saying that he
if Hunt had an office in the White
"would have to check it out.' 22
A few minutes later, with his chin resting on the tips of his hands, Byrd
zeroed in on a fundamental question; how could Dean have gotten into Hunt's
safe in the Executive Office Building, if he did not know that Hunt had an office
there? 2 3 What happened next is worth recalling verbatim:
Byrd: "Going back to Mr. Dean, when he [Dean] indicated that
he would have to check to see if Mr. Hunt had an office in the
Old Executive Office Building, he lied to the agents; didn't
he?"
Gray: "... I would have to conclude that that probably is correct, yes, sir.' 24
open" at Gray's admission, reported a Gannett News
"Jaws dropped
25
Service wire story.1
Gray's admission that Dean was lying was momentous! According to
the acting director of the FBI, Dean had definitely and deliberately misled the
FBI. That is, the President's own legal counsel was involved in the cover-up.
Byrd's interrogation of Gray had taken the investigation of the Watergate coverup not only inside the White House gates, but also into the Oval office.
The White House grasped the possible ramifications. It quickly issued a
statement defending Dean, and denouncing Byrd's line of questioning as "reprehensible, unfortunate, unfair, and incorrect."' 126 The truth was, as Nixon's
chief of staff,12 7H.R. Haldeman, wrote in his diary that night, "Gray has sort of
screwed US.'
121

Gray ConfirmationHearings, supra note 38, at 666-67.

122

Id.
Id. at 666-671.
Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
William Ringle, Jaws Drop As Gray Agrees Dean Lied,

123
124

125

HERALD DISPATCH,

Mar. 23, 1973,

at Al.
126
127

Rich, supra note 119, at 671.
H.R. HALDEMAN, THE HALDEMAN

DIARIES: INSIDE THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE

(entry of Mar.

22, 1973) 595 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1994).
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Gray's admission that Dean lied, as Senator Proxmire said, "broke open
the case," it "started an avalanche."'' 28 For one thing, it doomed his nomination
to be director of the FBI. 129 As Byrd asked: "Why would you continue to send
raw FBI files to a man who, to use your words, 'probably lied,' to an FBI
agent."' 130 When Gray answered: "that man is counsel to the president of the
United States," Byrd delivered the knock out punch by asking: "Where does
your first duty lie, to the President or to the FBI?"'' It was "amazing and incredible," Byrd told a reporter, that Gray provided Dean with 1FBI
investigation
32
agents.
his
to
lied
had
he
that
realizing
after
Watergate
on
files
On April 5, with no chance of the nomination coming out of the Judiciary Committee, Nixon withdrew Gray's nomination. 133 Nixon praised him as an
"able, honest, and dedicated American" who had been exposed to "totally unfair
innuendo and suspicion" because he had cooperated with Dean. 34 With the
defeat of Gray's nomination, the Nixon Administration was denied the ability to
continue using the FBI in the Watergate cover-up. 135
Byrd's questioning of Gray started the avalanche that led to Dean becoming the person who would personally and directly connect President Nixon
to the Watergate cover-up. Gray's admission that Dean "probably lied," had
made the President's counsel, heretofore, an obscure, little known White House
staffer, headline news -- the focal point of the investigation into the Watergate
cover-up. When Dean awoke the next morning, he found his house surrounded
36
by television cameras, news reporters, and a "whole army" of media people.
Besieged by
reporters, Dean pulled the curtains, drew the blinds, and stayed in
137
his house.
President Nixon called Dean at home later that morning and urged him
to go to Camp David for a few days. 138 Dean's four-day stay at the presidential
39
retreat, according to Ehrlichman, proved to be a "turning point" for him.'
128
129

119 CONG. REc. 14098 (1973).
Man Overboard, supra note 48, at 7.

130

Gray Confirmation Hearings, supra note 38, at 671.

131

Id. at 671-2.

132

Joy Aschenbach, Did John Dean Mislead the FBI?, WASH. STAR-NEwS, Mar. 23, 1973, at

A4; John W. Crewdson, Gray Testifies That Dean 'Probably' Lied, to F.B.I., N. Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 1973, at 1.
133
Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, They've Given Up on Mr. Gray, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
1973, at C7; Sanford Unger, The Abandoned Nominee, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1973, at Al;
George Lardner, Jr., President Quickly Consents, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1973, at Al.
134
1973 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1013 (Mary Wilson Cohn, ed., Congressional Quarterly
1974).
135 This point is well made by Mollenhoff, supra note 6.
136
JOHN W. DEAN III, BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 212 (Simon & Schuster
1976).
137 Id.
138
Id. at 213.
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Nixon's purpose in inviting Dean to Camp David was probably twofold. First, no doubt, he wanted Dean out of Washington and out of the spotlight of the media that had besieged his house after Gray had accused him of
lying to FBI agents. 140 More importantly, Nixon also wanted Dean to finish the
report that he, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman had been pushing for several weeks.
As the President's counsel, Dean had been given the assignment to write the
report stating there had been no White House involvement in Watergate, and, in
effect, absolving Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman from the break-in and the
cover-up. 141
At Camp David, Dean came to understand his own vulnerability in the
mess, and that he might be facing jail time. 142 And he began to believe that he
was being set up. The phony report that he was supposed to write would be the
President's insurance policy. If and when disclosures about the break-in and
the cover-up came to surface, Nixon would hold up Dean's report and assert that
his staff had misinformed him. 143 In his book, Blind Ambition, Dean wrote:
With my report in hand, he [President Nixon] would go before
the cameras to report that his counsel [Dean] had given him all
this information, that he had believed him, and trusted his investigation, but that obviously he had lied, had misled and deceived
him. Only Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and the President
would know I was making a sacrifice to keep the Nixon presidency from being consumed by Watergate, and I would go to
jail a disgraced scoundrel.' 44
Dean now became concerned that once he had written the report, he
would become expendable and could be cut loose. 145 He had seen, as in the
and Gray, that when it came to protecting Nixon,
cases of Magruder, Mitchell
146
expendable.
was
everyone
For weeks, while he had remained loyal to Nixon, Dean had seen other
Nixon staffers scramble to hire attorneys in order to protect themselves. 147 He
was now determined to protect himself. When he returned home from Camp

139

EHRLICHMAN, supra note 71, at 371-72.
140
Haldeman testimony to Watergate Committee, Aug. 4, 1974, reprinted in, WATERGATE:
CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 251 (William B. Dickinson, ed., Congressional Quarterly 1974).
141
DEAN, supra note 136, at 214; EMERY, supra note 37, at 276; OLSON, supra note 11, at 75.
142
See EHRLICHMAN, supra note 7 1, at 371-72.
143

EMERY, supra note 37, at 254, 276.

144

DEAN, supra note 136, at 214.

145 Id.
146 Id.
147

Id.
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148
David, Dean decided "I was not going to lie for anybody, even the President."'
He would not write "the phony report." And he issued a statement asserting that
he would not be made a "scapegoat" in the affair.' 49
Dean contacted his own lawyer about what course of action he should
take. 150 Dean told his attorney, "The shit is about to hit the fan, and the whole
town is going to smell bad very soon."' 5 1 By mid-April, Dean was talking to the
for immunity. 152
grand jury and negotiating deals with lawyers and prosecutors
153
The cover-up, as Dean later said, was now "unraveling."'
Later that month, Byrd and other Senate Democratic leaders began demanding the appointment of a Special Prosecutor to investigate the Watergate
cover-up. 154 Byrd, not satisfied with letting Gray take the fall, while speaking to
the National Press Club, called for the immediate firing of John Dean. 55
On May, 17, the Senate Watergate public hearings began. The next day,
May 18, Attorney General Elliot Richardson announced the appointment of
former Solicitor General and Harvard law professor Archibald Cox as special
prosecutor to investigate the Watergate case. 156 On June 25, in testimony to the
Senate Watergate Committee, Dean directly implicated the President in
the Wa157
tergate cover-up, leading to the downfall of the Nixon Administration.
Nothing in this article should be taken or used to dismiss, denigrate, or
even slight the important roles of the Washington Post reporters, Woodward and
Bernstein or Judge Sirica in uncovering the Watergate scandal. Woodward and
Bernstein were certainly deserving of their Pulitzer Prize, not only for their investigative reporting, but for simply keeping the story alive when no one else
was even interested in it.
The role of Judge Sirica was enormous; convinced that there was a larger dimension to the break-in at the Watergate, Sirica kept the pressure on the
original defendants hoping that one of them would start talking. 5 8 His strategy

148

Id. at 218.

supra note 12, at 3929.
supra note 71, 371-72.
151 DEAN, supra note 136, at 217-19; EHRLICHMAN, supra note 71, 371-2.
152
KURLAND, supra note 12, at 3929.
149

KURLAND,

150

EHRLICHMAN,

153 Dean used the expression "unraveling" in his opening statement to the Senate Watergate

Committee. A transcript of his statement is in, Excerpts of Fired Counsel's Statement to Bug
Committee, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 26, 1973, at 4.
154
1973 CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1016 (Mary Wilson Cohn, ed., Congressional Quarterly
1974); Spencer Rich & Richard Lyons, Special ProsecutorAsked, WASH. POST, May 2 1973, at
Al, A10.
155 Byrd Asks Immediate Firing of Dean, HUNTINGTON ADVERTISER, Apr. 20, 1973, at 14; Byrd
Callsfor Firingof Dean, WHEELING INTELLIGENCE, Apr. 20 1973, at 1.
156
RichardsonPicks Prosecutor,L. A. TIMES, May 18, 1973, at 1; Anthony Ripley, Archibald
Cox Appointed Prosecutorfor Watergate, N. Y. TIMES, May 19, 1973, at 77.
157 Excerpts of Fired Counsel's Statement to Bug Committee, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 26, 1973.
158
WHITE, supra note 36, at 204-205; MOLLENHOFF, supra note 22, at 259, 284-85.
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worked. On March 23, the day after Gray had acknowledged to Byrd that
"Dean probably lied," Judge Sirica released a letter from one of the defendants,
James McCord, that acknowledged that perjury had been committed at the trial,
the burglar's legal expenses had been paid with CPR funds, a cover-up had been
developed to keep the facts behind the burglary secret,
59 and the burglary was a
small part of a larger campaign of political sabotage.'
McCord's letter was a bombshell, and it was certainly crucial to opening up the Watergate investigation. At the time, no one outside the conspiracy
believed the White House would have been so stupid as to have left traces of
involvement.
It was such a bombshell that, coming the day after Byrd's questioning of Dean, it may have helped knock Byrd out of the histories of Watergate.
While slighted in the histories of the Watergate scandal, Byrd's contributions were recognized by a number of his contemporaries who grasped what
Byrd had done. "Gray's reluctant admission that Dean 'probably lied,' opened
up a whole new range of questions," wrote Mollenhoff: "Without Byrd's questioning, Gray wouldn't have been pushed into
the position of admitting that
16 1
Dean had 'probably lied' to the FBI officials."'
"It was his [Byrd's] informed, persistent questioning of L. Patrick Gray
... that opened the fissures between the agency and the White House," wrote
Clayton Fritchey in the Washington Post.162 "At the outset of the Senate hearings, Gray seemed assured of confirmation, but not' 163after Byrd adroitly led the
director-designate into calling John Dean ... a 'liar."
"In the beginning he was virtually all alone in his opposition to the confirmation of Mr. Gray," declared Senator Proxmire: "But his instincts
and his
1 64
reasons gained the day because he was both persistent and right."
Calling Byrd the "touchstone" in the Senate because of "his evaluation
of Pat Gray's credentials," the conservative syndicated columnist Holmes Alexander wrote of the impact of Byrd's interrogation on the Nixon Administration:
"We have come to a time when the President's bona fides are in dispute....
[T]here is no way to dodge the implication that Richard Nixon, after a long and
rewarding
stretch of shaming the devil, has suffered a relapse into insincer, 1 65
ity.

159

EMERY, supra note 37, at

160

Id. at 275.

161

Mollenhoff, supra note 6.

162

Clayton Fritchey, Sen. Byrd's Emergence as a Senate Leader, WASH. POST, June 2, 1973, at

255, 269-71, 273.

A19.
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Id.
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119 CONG. REc. 14098 (1973).
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Holmes Alexander, Byrd Makes Sense in Stand on Gray, MORGANTOWN POST, Mar. 27,

1973, at A6.
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For Byrd it was also a personal triumph of enormous dimensions as it
proved to be an important step on his path to becoming the Majority Leader of
the United States Senate. Byrd had held two Senate leadership positions, Secretary of the Democratic Conference and Senate Whip, and there was little question that he was coveting the Senate Majority Leadership. In 1973, however,
the position of Senate Majority Leader looked like it might be beyond Byrd's
reach. As the most powerful member of the Senate, it was a position of national
importance, and outside the Senate, Byrd had little recognition. Furthermore,
Byrd's base in the Senate had always been among the Southern conservatives,
but liberals now constituted a majority of the Democratic Party, and they were
skeptical of Byrd because of what they considered his conservative voting record in the Senate and his support of Nixon's conservative nominees to the Su66
preme Court. 1
Byrd's role in skewering Gray and, thus, beginning the unraveling of
the Watergate cover-up helped him overcome both of these potential drawbacks.
First, it gave him enormous name recognition. Byrd now became a major
speaker at political events across the country, 167 and he also became a favorite
on talk shows, both locally and nationally. Within the next few months he
would appear on Face the Nation, Issues and Answers, Washington's Panorama, and others. "With President Nixon's nomination of Gray" going down in
defeat, wrote AP political writer, Carl P. Leubsdorf, "the West Virginia Democrat stands on the verge of a significant triumph in his long-range campaign for
his party's top leadership position in the Senate ....
Byrd appears to have a
strengthened 8his position as the eventual successor to Democratic leader Mike
16
Mansfield."'
His role in bringing down the Nixon Administration also won him the
recognition and praise of the nation's liberals. "Liberals have come to respect
him," wrote Knight Ridder's Vera Glaser. 169 In the New Times, Nina Totenberg
reconciled the left wing's new found respect for the Senator that liberals for so
long had so castigated. 70 "There are the good ol' boys who sound like emptyheaded hicks but are as shrewd as can be," she wrote, but "when Senator Robert
Byrd of West Virginia maps out a strategy against you, you are in trouble. During the confirmation hearings of L. Patrick Gray for the directorship of the FBI,
the toughest and most brilliant questioning came from Senator Byrd. His ques-

166 Fritchey, supra note 162, at A19; Harry Hoffman, Self-Made Power, CHARLESTON
GAZETrE, Apr. 12 1974, at A6.
167
Hoffman, supra note 166, at A6.
168
Carl P. Leubsdorf (AP political writer), Byrd on Brink of Big Triumph, CHARLESTON DAILY
MAIL, Mar. 23, 1973, at Al.
169
Vera Glasser, Sen. Byrd's PoliticalStar Rising, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 15 1974, at
A5.
170

Nina Totenberg, Ten Dumbest Congressmen, NEW TIMES, May 17, 1974, at 14 (on file with

author).
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tions were the ones that elicited the most damaging ' 7replies - replies that led
eventually to the withdrawal of the Gray nomination."' '
"If one Senator is said to have gained something from the [Gray] affair," noted the New Republic, "it has to be Byrd. 72 He spoke out against Gray
before the nomination was even submitted .... He was sophisticated enough to
understand that proving Gray's evasiveness and inconsistencies in his handling
of the Watergate investigation was not enough. Gray's fallibility had to be
dramatized to the public and to the Senators.' 73 "Dean's 'lie' to bureau agents,
certified by acting FBI Director Gray, did more than anything else to torpedo
the nomination
within the White House and on Capitol Hill - and Byrd had
174
fashioned it.'
Four years later, with the retirement of Mansfield, the "unsung hero of
Watergate" was selected by Senate Democratic liberals as well as Democratic
conservatives
to be the leader of the Senate as a body as well as of the majority
75
party.

171
172

Id.
Man Overboard, supra note 48, at 7.

173

Id.

174

Id.
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